Global Warming and Fat Tailed-uncertainty: Rethinking the Timing and Intensity of Climate Policy by Chen, Yu-Fu & Funke, Michael
scottish institute for research in economics
SIRE DISCUSSION PAPER
SIRE-DP-2012-41
GLOBAL WARMING AND FAT TAILED-UNCERTAINTY: 
RETHINKING THE TIMING AND INTENSITY OF CLIMATE
POLICY
Yu-Fu Chen
University of Dundee
Michael Funke
Hamburg University
www.sire.ac.uk
GLOBAL WARMING AND FAT TAILED-
UNCERTAINTY: RETHINKING THE TIMING 
AND INTENSITY OF CLIMATE POLICY 
 
 
 
Yu-Fu Chen 
 
University of Dundee 
Economic Studies 
Dundee DD1 4HN 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Email: y.f.chen@dundee.ac.uk   
 
 
Michael Funke 
 
Hamburg University 
Department of Economics 
Von-Melle-Park 5 
20146 Hamburg 
GERMANY 
Email: funke@econ.uni-hamburg.de   
 
 
 
 
 
Dundee & Hamburg, Revised June 2012 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The possibility of low-probability extreme natural events has reignited the debate over the optimal 
intensity and timing of climate policy. In this paper, we contribute to the literature by assessing the 
implications of low-probability extreme events on environmental policy in a continuous-time real 
options model with “tail risk”. In a nutshell, our results indicate the importance of tail risk and call for 
foresighted pre-emptive climate policies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The term extreme event refers to infrequent weather and natural events that deviate significantly from 
the norm. Scientists cannot state with confidence that today´s extreme events are the first signs of 
climate change arising from greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Nevertheless, the monitoring and 
studying of extreme events, and learning how to cope with them, must be a priority. Global climate 
change could well affect the frequency, magnitude and location of extreme events. Extreme weather 
events that may be considered here include droughts (due to increased evaporation and reduced 
precipitation), river floods (due to increased precipitation), landslides (due to increased precipitation), 
Storms, cyclones and tornadoes (due to changing heat transport patterns and increased land-ocean 
temperature differential), and ocean and coastal surges and related flooding (due to storms and sea level 
rise). Any shift in average climatic conditions will almost inevitably boost the frequency of these 
extreme events - some of these changes are already occurring - and traditional diversification strategies 
may fail. Extreme climate events are different from other shocks because their impacts are persistent for 
many years or even permanent. Therefore extreme event research can be regarded as an 
interdisciplinary issue that cuts across a multitude of research fields.1 
The occurrence of an extreme event, however, does not automatically imply a prolonged impact upon 
economies. Apart from the obvious situation where an event occurs in an uninhabited area, impacts will 
vary depending notonly on the  location in which it occurs but also on spatial and temporal dimensions 
and the population and wealth at risk. It is, however, likely that extreme events will have an increasing 
effect on human well-being in future decades. Because the most affected countries in the tropics are 
poor, those most likely to be affected will be least able to adapt. On the other hand, the colder parts in 
the northern hemisphere may benefit from climate change, but they too face perils.2 
Consequently, critics of policies to reduce GHG emissions vigorously question whether policymakers 
should address these issues now, given that the monitoring of extreme event impacts is fraught with 
difficulties. These issues have sparked considerable debate in recent times. Do non-negligible low-
probability tail risks call for an early and significant environmental policy action? How much should we 
invest now in exchange for benefits in the distant future? What is the appropriate vigour of policy 
responses in the face of extreme, abrupt climate-change scenarios? This paper tries to come to grips 
with problems of this type. To place this analysis in context, it is useful to distinguish second-order 
uncertainty (thin-tail uncertainty) from higher-moment uncertainty (fat-tail uncertainty). Second-order 
                                                          
1 Valdez (2011) has argued that complex natural science climate models are at their limit when modelling extreme 
events and abrupt climate changes. If anything, climate models tend to underestimate past climate changes, 
compared to geological record. Climate simulations of the coming century may therefore give us a false sense of 
security.    
2 The Intergovermental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) and the Stern (2007) report have indicated that 
global warming will cause an increase in the frequency and severity of extreme weather events and natural 
disasters. Webster et al. (2005) and Hoyos et al. (2006) have shown that the number, duration, and intensity of 
hurricanes are highly correlated with temperature. See Weitzman (2009) for a recent discussion of catastrophic 
risks from climate change and references to the literature on this issue. 
 3
uncertainty examines the impact of the second moment of the distributions assuming that the 
distributions are normal or at least close to normal. Assumptions based on the impact of second-order 
uncertainty is the “industry standard” in the real options literature. In contrast, higher-moment 
uncertainty emphasises the issue of fat tails in the distribution of certain parameters and the risk of 
catastrophic climate change. 
Recent advances in theory have made real option valuation techniques applicable to a multitude of real 
world situations. A general discussion on real options can be seen from growing literature such as Dixit 
and Pindyck (1994), Stokey (2008), and Chevalier-Roignant et al (2011). Following the growing 
adaption of fat-tailed stochastic processes in derivatives pricing, extreme events are also used to in real 
options. e.g. Martzoukos and  Trigeorgis (2002) use multiple sources of extreme events to discuss the 
pricing of real options. In climate change research, Pindyck´s (2000) uses options-based model of 
irreversible investment to evaluate the thresholds of optimal environmental policy for greenhouse gas 
emission. For a brief survey of the real options approach in environmental economics, see Pindyck 
(2007, pp. 58-59). In this paper, we use a standard Levy process to discuss damage thresholds of the 
environmental policy for various possible changes in temperature scenarios.  
The layout of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we develop a continuous-time real option model of 
climate policy with “tail risk” addressing the complexities of climate change interactions and their 
challenging policy implications. The real option tool is widely used and very valuable in identifying and 
describing choices under uncertainty and irreversibility. Uncertainty and irreversibility are central to 
environmental policies. First, uncertainty surrounds the underlying climatological, geophysical, and 
hydrological processes. These uncertainties are exacerbated by uncertainty over the exact 
environmental damage, as well as uncertainty with regard to what technological progress might be 
required to ameliorate those environmental damages in the future. Second, climate patterns are partly 
irreversible, i.e. they cannot be reversed. Section 3 contains an in-depth numerical analysis and 
interpretation of our results. The final section of the paper summarizes some key findings and draws out 
some brief policy implications. Technical details and derivations are presented in the appendices. 
 
2. A Real Options Model of Irreversible Investment with Low-Probability Extreme Events 
 
Against this background, we develop an options-based model of irreversible investment incorporating 
extreme events. This adds yet another layer of complexity to the climate policy debate.3 Suppose that 
risk-averse policymakers is maximise the welfare function 
 
                                                          
3 Note that Baranzili et at (2003) have used a simple jump process, combined with a mean-reverting stochastic 
process or geometrical Brownian motion, to discuss the fat tail - climate policy nexus in a real option setup. 
However, their discussions are limited with respect to a stochastic process with a simple constant jump size. In 
contrast, we use a Levy process to discuss the impact of extreme events upon climate policy probabilistically with 
a spectrum of different jump sizes, generated from compound Poisson jumps. 
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where E[ ] is the expectation operator, r is the discount rate, tY  represents the output or consumption 
over time, tT  is changes in temperature since the pre-industry era, ( ),t tD Tθ is the damage function 
relative to tY , tθ  is the stochastic damage index  with μ > 1 and k > 0, and  w is the mitigation expenses 
necessary to keep the future temperature increase within a predetermined threshold. 
It is natural to assume that the damage ratio function is positively related to both the changes in 
temperature, Tt, and damages from extreme events due to climate change, tθ .4 Following Weitzman 
(2009), the change in temparature is modelled as 
 
(2) 
( )
1 2
ln /
= ,
ln 2
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t t
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where pM  is the inherited pre-industrial level of greenhouse gas, and 1m  and 2m  are positive 
parameters. Assume a doubling of the atmospheric greenhouse gases 2t pM M= . Equation (2) is then 
reduced to ( )1 2= 1t tdT m m T dt− . It is obvious that as time approaches infinity, changes in temparature 
reach the final equilibrium level 2=1T m∞ . Let H denote the half-time needed to reach the equilibrium 
change in temparature. Then we have 22 =1/HT m  and = HT T  at t = H.  It is straightforward to see that 
the process of T has the following solutions 
 
(3) 
ln 2 ln 2
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t t
H H
t HT e T T e
−
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞
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where 0T T=  at t = 0; 2 HT T∞ = ; t HT T=  at t = H with assumption T = 0; and equation (3) satisfies 
( )1 2= 1t tdT m m T dt− with 21 / 2 Hm T=  and 1 ln 22 Hm TH= . Equation (2) then simplifies to   
 
                                                          
4 In the climate change literature, e.g Weitzman (2010), the damage function is usually assumed to be convex to 
changes in temperature: d(D/dT) > 0 and d²(D/dT²) > 0. We choose a simple quadratic function with respect to T 
for the policymaker. This is consistent with the climate sensitivity estimates reported in Maslin and austin (2012). 
The damage function 2t tk Tμθ  is also a first-order approximation of the exponential damage function 
( )( )21 exp t tk Tθ− − , which gives 2t tk Tθ  by Taylor series expansion. The exponential damage function naturally 
gives the property of risk-averseness; hence, we add parameter μ  to our damage function. As the climate damage 
relative to the GDP is relatively small, one can consider the first-order Taylor series expansion to be a good 
approximation.  
 5
(4) ( ) ( )ln 2= 2 ,t H tdT T T dtH −  
 
Equations (4) is an essential building block in the real options modelling setup, while equation (3) is 
useful for directly integrating the intertemporal climate change damage function. We later use equation 
(3) to compute the integral directly by setting current temparature change since the pre-industry era to 
be T = 0.6. 
Therefore, the next step is to model the underlying uncertainty. In prototypical real option models a 
Gaussian structure for the shocks is usually assumed. However, the evidence presented above suggests 
that climate change is better described by distributions with fat tails. A heavy-tailed distribution 
attaches a higher probability to extreme events than normal distribution. There are many stochastic 
processes of heavy-tailed distributions used in finance. Among them is the commonly used Levy 
process which has independent and stationary increments. The Levy process treats extreme events 
probabilistically and is simultaneously fairly general and analytically tractable. Many continuous-time 
stochastic processes are special cases of the general Levy processes, such as the Brownian motion, and 
Poisson processes. In this paper, we use one-side compound Poisson jumps, combined with a Brownian 
motion, to model potential sudden swings (large kurtosis and skewness) of global/local 
social/environmental damage, caused by more frequent extreme events from GHG-induced climate 
changes. Broadly speaking, the compound Poisson processes in a Levy process show independent 
random variables with the same intensity as dictated by comparable Poisson processes, but the jump 
sizes of the random variables are independent and identically distributed with a Levy density. This 
means that by utilising different parameter values of a Levy density, we can model different types and 
intensities of extreme events.5 
The fat-tailed Levy process tX  with characteristic triplet ( )2 , ,σ ν γ  takes the form of the Levy-
Khinchin representation (see, e.g., Sato (1999); Cont and Tankov (2004)) 
 
(5)  ( ) ( )2 2 1exp 12tizX izx xzE e t i z e izx v dxσ γ ∞ ≤−∞⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ = − + + − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∫ 1 , 
 
where σ  is a positive real number, γ  is a constant, and ν  is a measure of the jump intensity with jump 
size x, satisfying ( )2 0x v dx∞
−∞
<∫  and ( )1x v dx> < ∞∫ . The stochastic process X can then be interpreted 
as a drifted Brownian motion combined with an independent compound Poisson process with jump 
                                                          
5 Rachev (2003) reviews the research on heavy tailed distributions in finance. Among others, further recent papers 
include Duffie et al. (2000), Cont and Tankov (2004), Kou and Wang (2004), Oksendal and Sulem (2007), and 
Schoutens (2007). 
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probability ( )v dxλ = ∫  and ( )v dx  is the Levy measure. In addition, the corresponding Levy 
infinitesimal generator of the Levy process X  has the form 
 
(6)  
( ) ( ) ( )
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For an exponential Levy process ( )expt tXθ = , we then have the following integro-differential Bellman 
equation by applying Ito-Levy lemma, as shown in Cont and Tankov (2004) and Schoutens (2003): 
 
(7) 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2 2
ln 21 1 2
1              ,
2
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y
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H
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where partial derivatives are denoted by subscripts. Below we assume a constant aggregate drift 
parameter α .6  Furthermore, Y is normalised to one. The meaning of the Levy process θ  can be 
explicitly explained as an equivalent geometric Brownian motion with compound Poisson jumps, which 
also yields Bellman equation (7), 
 
(8) 
1
tN
t t t t t i
i
d dt dz Jθ αθ σθ θ
=
= + + ∑ , 
 
where z is the standard Wiener process, and 
1
tN
i
i
J
=
∑  is a (memoryless) compound Poisson process with 
intensity 0λ > . Each of the jump sizes is i.i.d., and tN  is a Poisson process with intensity λ , 
independent from ( ) 1i iJ ≥ . The compound Poisson processes in a Levy process show independent 
random variables with the same intensity of the same Poisson process, but the jump sizes of random 
variables are independent and identically distributed with a Levy density. This means that we can model 
different extreme events via different parameter values of the Levy density. Note that the Brownian 
motion part does not enter the Levy measure and both are independent from each other.  
Furthermore we assume that the Levy measure has the one-sided density measure ( ) ( )y f dyν λ= = 
,ye dyηλη −  ,ye dyηλη −=  y > 0. Therefore, equation (7) can be rearranged to show 
                                                          
6 Note that ( ) ( )1 ye v dyα γ= + −∫ corresponds to the α parameter in Pindyck (2000). 
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The one-sided jumps – the same Levy density definition as in Kou and Wang (2004) – have two 
positive parameters of the Levy measure, λ  and η , which show the overall probability of such jump 
events occurring and the distributions of such jump events over y, respectively. It is straightforward to 
see that for smaller the values of  η , the extreme events in terms of higher values of y are occurring 
more often. Below we shall see that these two parameters substantially affect the climate policy 
implications. 
The policy maker faces a binary optimal stopping problem. Choosing no action in a business-as-usual 
scenario yields the no action welfare NW  with w = 0. On the contrary, if the policymaker adopts a 
credible environmental policy, a certain temperature target HT τ≤  is assumed to be met after H years 
by paying a fixed w percentage of output to reduce emission providing welfare of action AW . We show 
in Appendix A that the welfare for no action (business-as-usual case) NW  and the welfare of taking 
action AW  have the following solutions, if no real options are considered. 
 
 (10) ( )
( ) ( )2 2N
1
1 1
2 4 2 41 ,ln 2 ln 22
H H H H
Y
T T T T T TW k
r
H H
μθ
η φφ φ
⎡ ⎤
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where ( ) 21 1 1 02Yr
λμφ η μα μ μ σ
η μ
= − − − − − >
−
 and HT  is replaced by τ . 
To derive the optimal investment rule using dynamic programming, the value-matching condition has to 
be satisfied. The value-matching condition indicates that the marginal benefit value is equal to the 
marginal value of waiting or real options OW . The marginal value of investing or benefit from a 
credible climate policy is represented by A NW W− . Thus, we have the value-matching condition, 
 
(12)  ( ) ( ) ( )O , ,Y
wF T W T
r
μθ θ
η
= +
−
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where  
 
(13) 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
1
2 2
1
1
2 1 2
ln 22
4 2 4 1 2 4 4 1
           ln 2
H
H H H
T T w T
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T T T w T T w
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τ
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τ τ τ
φφ
− − − −
=
+
− − − −
− −
− +
+
 
 
where OW  denotes real options, θ  is the threshold where the society exercises its option to adopt the 
climate policy, i.e. for θ > θ , it is optimal to adopt the GHG-cutting policies. ( )F T  is positive (see 
Appendix A for details). The term ( )F T μθ  denotes the benefit of adopting the policies of reducing 
GHG and temperatures while the term ( )YwY r η−  gives the intertemporal value of (future) sunk cost 
from the credible climate policy as the policy maker pays w every year.  
It is well-known that analytical solutions for jumps to a pre-jump-state-dependent state outside the 
continuation region are difficult to obtain. We therefore compute the real option values OW  and the 
thresholds θ numerically. We employ a standard explicit finite difference method, and the 
discretisation method of the Level jump integral is similar to Cont and Voltchkova (2005). In addition 
to the value-matching condition (13), the numerical solutions need to satisfy the following boundary 
conditions: 
 
(14) ( )O 0, 0W Tθ = = , 
(15) ( ) ( ) ( )( )O A Nlim , lim max , , ,0W T W T W T
θ θ
θ θ θ
→∞ →∞
= − , 
(16) ( ) ( ) ( )( )O A NMax Max Max, , , ,0W T W T W Tθ θ θ= − . 
 
Equations (14) and (15) are straightforward as we expect that a zero value of θ  gives zero real option 
value, while a large value for θ  will lead to an immediate exercise of the real option. The terminal 
condition for T needs to be handled with care. We assume that the policymaker will exercise the real 
option once T is approaching maxT τ= , whereby maxT τ>  means that it is too late to adopt an effective 
climate policy. The θ  thresholds are obtained after backward computation maxT T τ= =  to 0.6T = , the 
current changes in temperature relative to pre-industrial level, by an explicit finite difference method 
(see Appendix B for further computational details). Once we have obtained the thresholds θ , we can 
compute the damage thresholds D  as 
 
(17) 2 0.36D k T kμ μθ θ= = , 
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assuming that current T is 0.6 degrees higher than in the pre-industrial era. 
The model presented above frames the economic analysis of highly uncertain extreme climate events. 
This provides the platform for the numerical analysis that allows us to solve the optimal stopping 
problem and solve for the optimal intensity and timing of policy responses. 
  
4. Model Simulations 
 
Section 3 has provided a detailed presentation and discussion of the main features of the model. As we 
do not have the closed-form solutions for real options, we need to use extensive numerical illustrations 
to gain further insight into the results of the previous section in order to get an intuitive “feel” for the 
model. The most important goal of these simulations is to see how certain crucial aspects of the model 
react to changes in parameters. In order to simulate the model, we need to cross the “minefield” of 
calibration. As methodological issues related to calibration are not the focus of this paper, a pragmatic 
stance is taken. 
The benchmark values for parameters are r = 0.035, 0.0α = , 0.2σ = , T = 0.6, H = 100, τ = 2.0. 7 The 
baseline parameter for μ  in our global analysis is set to 1.2.8 Furthermore we assume 1.2μ = , 0.0Yη = , 
k = 1/1000. The costs for mitigation costs are 2 per cent of worldwide GDP such that 0.02w = .  
The calibration of the one-sided positive exponential compound jump distribution for extreme events 
needs some further consideration. As pointed out by Cont and Tankov (2004, Table 4.3), the probability 
density function of a Brownian motion with exponential compound jumps is not available in closed 
form. Therefore, we have to approximate the continuous probability density function (8) using discrete 
subsamples. In particular, we focus on the ranges for the values of λ and η . The exponential 
distribution of compound jumps, ye ηη − , implies that when jumps occur, most jumps are small, but 
sometimes the jumps become much larger, depending on the value of parameter η  and λ . Last but not 
least, the choice of η and λ is made more difficult by the limited information about extreme event 
probabilities and their economic impact. Integrated assessment models yield a rough consensus that for 
mean temperature increases up to 4º C relative to today’s temperature, the most likely impact is from 1 
per cent to 5 per cent of GDP. Little is known about the outer tail of the distribution, but there is a real 
chance, substantiated by recent studies, that temperature increases of 3º C or 4º C could have a much 
                                                          
7 The deterministic trend term α has been assumed to be zero without loss of generality. It may reflect the fact that 
the recent increase in temperature may be a transient phenomenon in a cyclical process that has no overall long-
term trend. For example, a local upswing in an interdecadal sine wave may appear to be a trend when viewed in 
isolation. 
8 What is most certain is that the poorest countries in the developing world will be least able to adapt to any 
increase in the frequency and magnitude of extreme weather phenomena. Weitzman (2009) has demonstrated that 
in some regions extreme events may lead to very low consumption levels. This implies that welfare losses in those 
regions become large, and potentially unbounded. In a global analysis those results for a few regions are averaged 
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larger impact, as high as 8-10 per cent of GDP.9 Below we assume that the benchmark value for the 
jump probability λ  is equal to 6 per cent. We then determine a suitable range of η  parameters such that 
the extreme event probabilities of different jump sizes are in the right order of magnitude.  
As no analytical lognomal probability distribution function is available for θ  in equation (8), we 
numerically simulate the probability density distribution of θ. The technical details of the numerical 
procedure are discussed below. Formally, equation (8) can be proxied by the Euler scheme  
 
(18) 
1
N
t t t t t t t i
i
t t Jθ θ αθ σθ ε θ+Δ
=
= + Δ + Δ + ∑ ,       ( )~ 0;1t Nε ,   
 
where tJ  is simulated from the exponential distribution of 
ye ηη − .10 The intuition behind (18) exactly 
parallels that of its continuous-time counterpart (8). The distribution of the jumps is proxied by 
−ln(uniform distribution of [0,1])/η. This implies that the frequency of extreme events ranges from 
several years to decades or more.  
In addition to providing some important intuition behind our results, equation (18) also delivers another 
important point. The extreme events are governed by the parameters η and λ. Indeed, smaller jumps 
happen more often for higher value of η. Conversely, greater disasters happen more often for smaller 
value of the parameter η. Technically, in the numerical simulations we pick 1 million random samples 
of (18) for θ t with initial values 0 20θ = , σ = 0.2, λ = 0.06, and 0.01tΔ = , and each realisation for θ is 
calculated for 10 years. The calibrated results in Figure 1 show distinctively that the lognormal 
probability distribution function depends upon which η  parameter is at work. The left-hand side graph 
assumes η  = 10 and the right-hand side graph uses η  = 5. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
out, but with a regional focus, these fat tails in single regions may drive the analysis. Below we therefore provide 
a sensitivity analysis with respect to μ.    
9For a recent overview of concurrent studies, see Tol (2009). A graphical summary of damage estimates is 
provided by Dietz and Stern (2008).   
10 The sequential times of Poisson jumps are proxied by −ln(uniform distribution of [0,1])/λ. Therefore, when a 
Poisson jump happens, θ  increases by ( )1iYt eθ − . 
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Figure 1: Probability Density Distributions of θ for λ = 0.06 and η = 10 vs. η = 5 
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Notes: The probability distribution functions for η = 5 and η = 10 are skewed to the right, and the skewness 
increases as the value of σ increases. The probability distribution functions start at zero, increase to their modes, 
and decrease thereafter. The solid curves give the geometrical Brownian motion without compound jumps, i.e. 
without the last term in (18). The dashed curves give the simulated (lognormal) probability density function with 
jumps. 
 
The salient features of the distribution are the location of its peak and the shape and extent of the 
distribution at large θ. The model specification creates positive skewness in the distribution of θ .11 
Figure 1 indicates the predominance of the right fat tail in a transparent way. When comparing the 
Monte Carlo results with jumps (dashed curves) and without jumps (solid curves), it is apparent that for 
η = 10 the probability of extreme events occurring is relatively close to the Brownian motion 
distribution without compound jumps. On the contrary, for η = 5 the distributions are somewhat more 
stretched out, with more mass in the right tails at the expense of lower modes. One way to reconcile the 
probability density plots with the data is to calculate the implied probabilities of an extreme event θ  > 
θ*. Table 1 presents these implied extreme event probabilities from our Monte Carlo exercise. The 
period under consideration is 10 years. Due to lack of empirical data, the choice of a baseline parameter 
for η is somewhat arbitrary. We choose a value of η = 10 in order to be broadly consistent with rough 
and scant estimates of extreme-impact tail probabilities. We therefore use λ = 0.06 and η = 10 as our 
back-of-the-envelope baseline tail estimates in what follows.12 
 
                                                          
11  Roe and Baker (2007) have recently described climate probability distribution functions from the multi-
ensemble climatepredition.net experiment with shapes similar to those in Figure 3. Roe and Baker (2009)  have 
shown that this shape of the distribution is not an artefact of the analysis or choice of model parameters but an 
inevitable consequence of a system in which complex feedbacks among the individual physical processes are 
substantially positive.  
12 It is understood that the analysis is inevitably subjective because it requires some form of speculation about 
undesirable fat-tail probabilities. However, the sensitivity analysis below scrutinizes the baseline parameters and 
thus provides a good grasp of the robustness of the policy implications.   
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Table 1: Size-Dependent Extreme Event Probabilities for λ = 0.06 in Percent 
 No Jumps η = 10 η = 5 
θ  = 40 8.52 10.43 13.07 
θ  = 50 4.15 5.35 7.30 
θ  = 60 2.14 2.88 4.29 
θ  = 70 1.15 1.61 2.64 
θ  = 80 0.65 0.94 1.71 
Note: The initial θ is 20. Therefore, the row θ > 40 gives the probability of at least one θ doubling after 10 years. 
 
Another parameter which needs to be considered is HT . The IPCC’s fourth assessment report presents 
various projections computed by different carbon cycle models and we choose four main projections – 
B2, A1B, A2 and A1F1 – to test the impact of changes of HT  on the thresholds.  Armed with the 
insights from the Monte Carlo exercise, we now use numerical techniques to solve the optimal stopping 
problem and calibrate the optimal climate policy response for these four projections. The graphs give 
the critical threshold values θ delimiting the no action area. For θ  < θ , it is optimal to wait before 
adopting a stringent climate policy that imposes large sunk costs on consumers. In contrast, for θ  ≥ 
θ policymakers will incur the cost of emission reduction to reduce temperature. The intended 
contribution of these exercises is to illustrate how the choice of selected parameters alters the policy 
implications.  Below is the table for the θ  thresholds and the corresponding damage thresholds of 
equation (17): 
 
Table 2: The impacts of various HT  from Projections B2, A1B, A2 and A1F1 on θ  and D  
 
Scenarios 
Temperature change since 
Pre-Industrial Level, HT * 
 
θ  
percentage Damage 
Thresholds D  in % 
B1 2.4 14.48 2.224 
B2 or A1T 3.0 6.56 0.860 
A1B 3.4 4.86 0.600 
A2 4.0 3.44 0.397 
A1F1 4.6 2.69 0.295 
Note: 0.6 degrees temperature increase is added to the original figures as we use the changes in temperature since 
the pre-industrial level. 
 
It is shown that different estimates of HT  lead to very different conclusions as to whether or not the 
policy maker should act immediately. For example, in the B1 scenario the policymaker would only act 
when the current damage is over 2.2 percent of world GDP. Thus, a rather restrained and reluctant 
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policy response can be expected. On the contrary, the A2 and A1F1 scenarios lead to immediate actions 
from the policymakers to act.  
By using the above benchmark values of variables, we can then investigate the impacts of changes in 
parameters on the policy thresholds θ . Figure 2 shows the impact of changes in η over the grid ηi ∈ 
{5, 20}; Figure 3 shows the impact of changes in λ over the grid λi ∈ {0.0, 0.12}. These numerical 
assumptions span a broad range of possibilities. The numerical results in Figures 2 and 3 can be 
interpreted as follows: For smaller values of η, greater disasters happen more often leading to a much 
lower policy threshold θ . This implies that an increasing probability of tail risks sharply strengthens 
the case for earlier reduction of GHG emissions with more stringent climate policies increasing in fatter 
tails.13 Figure 3 indicates the sensitivity of the policy threshold θ with respect to λ. A larger λ implies a 
larger jump probability. The policy implications are again stark. The numerical results suggest that 
policymakers need to respond more aggressively to climate change for larger λ, i.e. optimal policies 
turn out to be significantly more “conservationist”. The numerical results also call into question 
previous work which has neglected such possibilities. 
 
Figure 2: The Impact of Changes in η on the Policy Thresholds θ and D 
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13 This qualitative result of more drastic GHC reductions as an insurance to hedge tail risks is consistent with the 
well-known “minimax” strategy in game theory. In these games, the objective is to determine the optimum pay-
off for each separate strategy in order to minimize the maximum gain of the opponents. In climate policy, 
policymakers are not playing a traditional game but a battle against the forces of nature. Under the minimax rule, a 
strategy must be selected for which the maximum possible damage is as small as possible. 
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Figure 3: The Impact of Changes in λ on the Policy Threshold θ and D 
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In Figures 2 and 3 we have used a counterfactual – and more pessimistic – scenario of λ = 0.12 for the 
jump probability. In order to provide readers with an assessment of the implied risks, we have now 
calculated the probability density distribution of θ for λ = 0.12 along the lines of Figure 1 and Table 1. 
The period under consideration in Table 3 is again 10 years. The comparison between Table 1 and 
Table 2 shows that extreme events are two to three times more likely for our upper bound λ = 0.12.  
 
Table 3: Size-Dependent Extreme Event Probabilities for λ = 0.12 in Percent 
 No Jumps η = 10 η = 5 
θ  = 40 18.33 24.24 30.93 
θ  = 50 8.52 12.50 18.18 
θ  = 60 4.15 6.76 11.16 
θ  = 70 2.14 3.81 7.19 
θ  = 80 1.15 2.22 4.82 
Note: The initial θ0 is 20. Therefore, the row θ > 40 gives the probability of one θ doubling after 10 years. 
 
Figure 4: Probability Density Distribution of θ for λ = 0.12 and η = 10 vs. η = 5 
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Figure 5 shows the sensitivity of the policy threshold θ  to changes in σ. Contrary to standard real 
option models, θ  is not a monotonically increasing function of σ. Rather, the resulting relationship 
turns out to be hump-shaped. At the outset, an increase in σ implies an increase in the policy threshold 
θ . The more uncertainty there is over the future, the greater is the incentive to wait and see rather than 
adopting the policy now. Beyond the inflection point, this relationship is inversed. The reason is that in 
our framework σ also affects the particular solution via μθ , μ > 1. This effect counteracts, and 
eventually dominates, the traditional option effect. 
 
Figure 5: The Sensitivity of the Policy Thresholds to Changes in σ 
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The graph indicates that the impact of second-order (thin-tail) uncertainty is relatively small. The 
implication is that best-guess or certainty-equivalent climate policy maybe a reasonable approximation. 
This finding is consistent with findings of Pizer (1999). 
Similarly, we can determine the dependence of θ  on other parameters. In Figure 6 we investigate how 
strongly our conclusions would change if we were to adopt a lower discount rate. The Stern Report 
(2007) represented a break with earlier climate economics modelling approaches in several respects.14 
The most widely discussed innovation was Stern´s (2007) discount rate of just over 1 per cent, which is 
well outside the consensus range. To explore the sensitivity to alternative discounting assumptions, we 
employ a range of 0.025 < r < 0.050. As expected, the results in Figure 6 affirms the view that higher 
discount rates will bolster the reasons for taking a “wait and see” attitude” towards climate policy. This 
is because for small r the particular integral is a good deal bigger and therefore the 
intertemporal damage is substantially larger. Conversely, a higher discounting factor will trigger a later 
adoption and a lower intensity of climate policy. This highlights the importance of attaining a consensus 
on the discount rate before an appraisal on the optimal timing of policy implementation can be 
achieved. 
 
                                                          
14 For the discussion of the report, see “Special Topic: The Stern Review Debate” in the journal Climatic Change 
89 (2008), No. 3-4, pp. 173-449. We don´t consider r = 0 , i.e. an elimination of the time preference rate [Azar and 
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Figure 6: The Impact of the Discount Rate r on the Policy Thresholds  
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Putting aside the debates over the “correct” values for λ, η, r, and σ, let us finally consider the 
importance of the damage function exponent μ. How much would optimal policies be changed due to 
variation in this parameter? 
 
Figure 7: The Impact of μ on the Policy Thresholds 
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The solution exhibits the properties that one would expect. The effect of μ is stark, far bigger than 
extreme events parameters themselves. This means that if the extreme events cause convex (much 
bigger) damages, then governments should act much earlier. However, only with lower parameter 
values for μ  is immediate action motivated. The reason is that exercising the climate policy option 
incurs large sunk costs, while inaction only involves emissions over the waiting period. The underlying 
incentive for adopting a “wait and see” stance is that in the future we may receive more data, learn more 
about climate sensitivity, the economic impact of higher temperatures, and develop low-carbon 
technologies. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Sterner (1996)]  because the particular integral goes to infinity for r < 0.013 with current benchmark values and 
therefore the system explodes.  
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5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The possibility of low-probability extreme events calls for a fresh look at the optimal intensity and 
timing of climate policy. The contribution of this paper is to develop a modelling framework for 
formally investigating the impact of higher-moment uncertainty on near-term climate policies. More 
specifically, we specify a continuous-time real option model more general than those used by others, in 
that it includes low probability extreme events. The numerical calibrations indicate the importance of 
perhaps unlikely but potentially significant “tail risk”. Factoring a fat tail into the real option framework 
demonstrates a higher value of pre-emptive climate policy.   
Although we believe that a hierarchy of models of increasing comprehensiveness will eventually need 
to be used in order to refine the basic insights we provide here, policymakers should nevertheless 
actively overcome the common bias towards undervaluing extreme events. In this spirit, the modelling 
framework can lead policymakers to improve the valuation of climate change that occurs with great 
uncertainty or low probability and target an important set of low-probability possibilities in a sensible 
way.  
 
 
 
Appendix A: Derivation of Equations (10) and (11) 
 
We need to find the direct integral solution to equation (1) in the text without considering the real 
options. Substituting equation (3) into the integral of equation (1) yields 
 
(A1) 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2ln 2 ln 22
0
ln 22
2 2
0 0
ln 2
2 2
0 0
1 2 1
   4 4
      4 2 4
YY
Y
Y
Y
Y
t t r tt H H
t H
r tr t H
H H t
r t r tH
H H t H t
W e k e T T e e dt
e dt k T TT T e dt
k T T T e dt kT e dt
ηη μ
ηη μ
η ημ μ
θ
θ
θ θ
∞ −
− −
−
⎛ ⎞
− + −∞ ∞ ⎜ ⎟
− − ⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞
− + −∞ ∞⎜ ⎟
− −⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= − − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
= − − +
+ − −
∫
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
 
 
Collecting terms gives 
 
(A2) 
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2 2
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2 2
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4 4
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Most of the above integrals involve general forms of the integral 
 
(A3) 
0
a bt
t e dtθ
∞
−∫ , subject to 0t t t t t td dt dz dXθ α θ σθ θ= + + . 
 
A natural way to solve the above integral is via the Bellman equation, 
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(A4) ( ) ( ) ( )2 21 .
2
a ybV V V V e V dyθ θθθ αθ σ θ θ θ ν
∞
−∞
⎡ ⎤= + + + −⎣ ⎦∫  
 
We conjecture that V under the Levy process setting have the following form of solution, 
 
(A5) V c μθ= , 
 
where c is an unknown parameter to be determined. We then have 
 
(A6) a aa V c aθα θ α θ=  
 
and 
(A7) ( )2 2 21 1 1
2 2
aV c a aθθσ θ σ θ= − . 
 
The Levy integral term of V needs to be handled with care. As V is drawn from two separate cases, one 
can compute the integral of ( )
0
y yW e W e dyηλ θ η∞ −⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦∫  without considering changes of states for 
exponential compound jumps involved in real options. 
 
(A8) 
0
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where the constraint aη >  is needed to avoid the infinity of the integral. Substituting equations (A6)-
(A8) back to equation (A4) yields 
 
(A9) ( ) 21 1
2
a
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a
λ θθ θ α θ σ θ
η
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−
. 
 
Rearranging the above equation gives 
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a
λθ α σ
η
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It is a straightforward to show that the solutions to 
0
a bt
t e dtθ
∞
−∫  are represented by 
 
(A11) 
( ) 21 1
2
a
V ab a a a
a
θ
λ
α σ
η
=
− − − −
−
. 
 
Now we can substituting (A11) back to (A2) by setting w = 0 prviding the value of no action 
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where ( ) 21 1 1 02Yr
λμφ η μα μ μ σ
η μ
= − − − − − >
−
. 
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Following the same reasoning, we obtain the value of taking action by replacing HT  with τ . 
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Note that terms in the brackets [.] of equations (A12) and (13) can be show as positive, since 
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Then finally, we have 
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Similarly for the square bracket term of equation (A13) 
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Thus, it is obvious that ( ) 0F T >  for equation (13) in the text  
 
 20
(A16) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
2
2 2
2
1 1 1 1 1 1
ln 2 ln 28 1 4 1 4
0ln 2 ln 2 ln 2 ln 2 ln 22 2
H H
T w T T T w T TwT H HF T
H H H H H
τ τ
φ φ φ φ φ φ
⎛ ⎞
− −
− − − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
= + + >⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞+ + + + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
. 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Computation of Real Options by Explicit Finite Difference Method 
 
The integro-differential Bellman equation for real options can be represented by the homogenous part 
of equation (9) in the text,   
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By using an explicit finite difference method, we obtain the following approximations, 
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We follow  the approximation by Cont and Voltchkova (2005) for ( ) ( )
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For normalised j XΔ = 1, we have  ( )( )
( )1 2
1 2
k X
k k X
yν ν
+ Δ
− Δ
= ∫  ( ) ( )( )1 2 1 2k X k Xe eη ηλ − + Δ − + Δ= − −  
( ) ( )( )1 2 1 2k X k Xe eη ηλ − − Δ − + Δ= − . Therefore, we have 
 
(B6) 
( ) ( )1 2 1 2k X k X
j X j X
k e e
η η
ν λ
− Δ + Δ
− −
Δ Δ
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. 
 
Substituting equations (B2) – (B5) back into equation (B1) yields  
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Finally, rearranging and simplifying further allows us to obtain  
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Note that ( ) ( )ln 2 ln 22 HT r i TH H
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+ − Δ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 need to be positive; otherwise, the scheme does not converge. 
Next we need to decide the free boundary conditions for threholds θ , as well as the boundary and 
terminal conditions for θ  and T. The boundary and terminal conditions of equations (14) – (16) become 
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The numerical solutions for the real options start backwards from terminal condition B(10) at maxi  with 
boundary conditions (B9) and (B10) and free boundary conditions checked. Afterwards, we step 
backwards to max 1i −  and compute max 1,i jv − , and the free boundary conditions – the value-matching 
condition – becomes 
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(B13) ( )A N, , , ,max ,i j i j i j i jv W W v= − . 
 
After having obtained the thresholds for θ , the backward procedure is used until 0.6i TΔ = , the 
currrent level of T,  is obtained. 
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